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We present the optimal collective attack on a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol in the
“device-independent” security scenario, where no assumptions are made about the way the QKD
devices work or on what quantum system they operate. Our main result is a tight bound on the
Holevo information between one of the authorized parties and the eavesdropper, as a function of
the amount of violation of a Bell-type inequality.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) allows two parties,
Alice and Bob, to generate a secret key in the presence of
an eavesdropper, Eve. The secret key can then be used
for different tasks, for instance encryption of a message.
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard invented the first QKD
protocol, known as BB84 [1]. A few years later, Ekert in-
dependently rediscovered that quantum correlations can
be used to distribute secrecy [2]. Since then, research
on quantum cryptography has witnessed enormous ad-
vances, both theoretical and experimental [3].
Existing QKD schemes rely for security on several as-
sumptions. The basic one is that any eavesdropper, how-
ever powerful, must obey the laws of quantum physics. In
addition to it, there are two other requirements, without
which no shared secret key can be established. The first
one is the freedom and secrecy of measurement settings:
on each particle, both Alice and Bob should be allowed
to choose freely among at least two measurement settings
(e.g., the two bases of BB84) and this choice should not
be known to Eve, at least as long as she can act on the in-
coming quantum states (in BB84, the bases are revealed,
but only after the measurements are performed). The
second requirement, even more obvious, is the secrecy of
outcomes : at no stage there should be a leakage of in-
formation about the final key. These two requirements
can be summarized by saying that no unwanted classical
information must leak out of Alice’s and Bob’s labora-
tories. If an implementation has a default in this point
(e.g., if a Trojan Horse attack is possible, or if Eve can
access Bob’s computer), no security can be guaranteed.
In addition to these essential requirements, existing se-
curity proofs [4, 5, 6] assume that Alice and Bob have (al-
most) perfect control of the state preparation and of the
measurement devices. This assumption is often critical:
for instance, the security of the BB84 protocol is entirely
compromised if Alice and Bob, instead of sharing qubits
as usually assumed, share 4-dimensional systems [7, 8].
At first sight, control of the apparatuses seems to be
an inescapable requirement. Remarkably, this is not the
case: we present here a device-independent security proof
against collective attacks by a quantum Eve for the pro-
tocol described in Ref. [9]. Our proof holds under no
other requirements than the essential ones listed above.
It is therefore “device-independent” in the sense that it
needs no knowledge of the way the QKD devices work,
provided quantum physics is correct and provided Alice
and Bob do not allow any unwanted signal to escape from
their laboratories.
In a collective attack, Eve applies the same attack on
each particle of Alice and Bob, but no other limitations
are imposed to her. In particular she can keep her sys-
tems in a quantum memory and perform a (coherent)
measurement on them at any time. Collective attacks
are very meaningful in QKD because a bound on the key
rate for these attacks becomes automatically a bound for
the most general attacks if a de Finetti theorem can be
applied, as is the case in the usual security scenario [10].
The physical basis for our device-independent security
proof is the fact that measurements on entangled par-
ticles can provide Alice and Bob with non-local corre-
lations, i.e., correlations that cannot be reproduced by
shared randomness (local variables), as detected by the
violation of Bell-type inequalities. Considered in the per-
spective of QKD, the fact that Alice’s and Bob’s symbols
are correlated in a non-local way, whatever be the under-
lying physical details of the apparatuses that produced
those symbols, implies that Eve cannot have full infor-
mation about them, otherwise her own symbol would be
a local variable able to reproduce the correlations.
This intuition has been around for some time [2, 11,
12]. Quantitative progress has been possible however
only recently, thanks to the pioneering work of Barrett,
Hardy and Kent [13] and to further extensions [7, 9, 14].
For conceptual interest and mathematical simplicity, all
these works studied security against a supra-quantum
Eve, who could perform any operation compatible with
the no-signalling principle. The proof of Ref. [13] ap-
plies only to the zero-error case; those in Refs [7, 9] al-
low for errors but restrict Eve to perform individual at-
tacks; Masanes and Winter [14] proved non-universally-
composable security under the assumption that Eve’s at-
tack is arbitrary but is not correlated with the classical
post-processing of the raw key. In this paper, we focus on
the more realistic situation in which Eve is constrained
2by quantum physics, and prove universally-composable
security against collective attacks.
The protocol. The protocol that we study is a modifi-
cation of the Ekert 1992 protocol [2] proposed in Ref. [9].
Alice and Bob share a quantum channel consisting of
a source that emits pairs of entangled particles. On
each of her particles Alice chooses between three possi-
ble measurements A0, A1 and A2, and Bob between two
possible measurements B1 and B2. All measurements
have binary outcomes labelled by ai, bj ∈ {+1,−1} (note
however that the quantum systems may be of dimen-
sion larger than 2). The raw key is extracted from the
pair {A0, B1}. In particular, the quantum bit error rate
(QBER) is Q = prob(a0 6= b1). As mentioned in the in-
troduction, Eve’s information is bounded by evaluating
Bell-type inequalities, since these are the only entangle-
ment witnesses which are independent of the details of
the system. In our case, Alice and Bob use the measure-
ments A1, A2, B1, and B2 on a subset of their particles to
compute the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) poly-
nomial [15]
S = 〈a1b1〉+ 〈a1b2〉+ 〈a2b1〉 − 〈a2b2〉 , (1)
which defines the CHSH inequality S ≤ 2. We note that
there is no a priori relation between the value of S and
the value of Q: these are the two parameters which are
available to estimate Eve’s information. Without loss of
generality, we suppose that the marginals are random for
each measurement, i.e., 〈ai〉 = 〈bj〉 = 0 for all i and j.
Were this not the case, Alice and Bob could achieve it
a posteriori through public one-way communication by
agreeing on flipping a chosen half of their bits. This
operation would not change the value of Q and S and
would be known to Eve.
Eavesdropping. In the device-independent scenario,
Eve is assumed not only to control the source (as in usual
entanglement-based QKD), but also to have fabricated
Alice’s and Bob’s measuring devices. The only data avail-
able to Alice and Bob to bound Eve’s knowledge are the
observed relation between the measurement settings and
outcomes, without any assumption on how the measure-
ments are actually carried out or on what system they
operate. In complete generality, we may describe this
situation as follows. Alice, Bob, and Eve share a state
|Ψ〉ABE inH⊗nA ⊗H⊗nB ⊗HE , where n is the number of bits
of the raw key. The dimension d of Alice and Bob Hilbert
spaces HA = HB = Cd is unknown to them and fixed by
Eve. The measurement Mk yielding the k
th outcome of
Alice is defined on the kth subspace of Alice and chosen
by Eve. This measurement depends on the kth setting
Ajk chosen by Alice, but possibly also on all previous
settings and outcomes: Mk = M(Ajk , A¯k−1, ak−1) where
A¯k−1 = (Aj1 , . . . , Ajk−1) and a¯k−1 = (aj1 , . . . , ajk−1).
The situation is similar for Bob.
Collective attacks. In this paper, we focus on collective
attacks where Eve applies the same attack to each sys-
tem of Alice and Bob. Specifically, we assume that the
total state shared by the three parties has the product
form |ΨABE〉 = |ψABE〉⊗n and that the measurements
are a function of the current setting only, e.g., for Alice
Mk = M(Ajk). (From now on, we thus simply write the
measurement M(Aj) as Aj).
For collective attacks, the secret key rate r under one-
way classical postprocessing from Bob to Alice is lower-
bounded by the Devetak-Winter rate [16],
r ≥ rDW = I(A0 : B1) − χ(B1 : E) , (2)
which is the difference bewteen the mutual information
between Alice and Bob, I(A0 : B1) = 1− h(Q) (h is the
binary entropy), and the Holevo quantity between Eve
and Bob, χ(B1 : E) = S(ρE)− 12
∑
b1=±1 S(ρE|b1). Note
that the rate is given by (2) because χ(A0 : E) ≥ χ(B1 :
E) holds for our protocol [9, 17]; it is therefore advanta-
geous for Alice and Bob to do the classical postprocessing
with public communication from Bob to Alice.
Upper-bound on the Holevo quantity. To find Eve’s
optimal collective attack, we must find the largest value
of χ(B1 : E) compatible with the observed parameters
without assuming anything about the physical systems
and the measurements that are performed. Our main
result is the following.
Theorem. Let |ψABE〉 be a quantum state and
{A1, A2, B1, B2} a set of measurements yielding a vio-
lation S of the CHSH inequality. Then after Alice and
Bob have symmetrized their marginals,
χ(B1 : E) ≤ h
(
1 +
√
(S/2)2 − 1
2
)
. (3)
Before presenting the proof of this bound, we give an
explicit attack which saturates it; this example clarifies
why the bound (3) is independent of Q. Eve sends to
Alice and Bob the two-qubit Bell-diagonal state
ρAB(S) = 1 + C
2
PΦ+ +
1− C
2
PΦ− , (4)
where PΦ± are the projectors on the Bell states |Φ±〉 =
(|00〉 ± |11〉)√2 and C =
√
(S/2)2 − 1. She defines the
measurements to be B1 = σz , B2 = σx and A1,2 =
1√
1+C2 σz ±
C√
1+C2σx. Any value of Q can be obtained
by choosing A0 to be σz with probability 1− 2Q and to
be a randomly chosen bit with probability 2Q. This at-
tack is impossible within the usual assumptions because
here not only the state ρAB, but also the measurements
taking place in Alice’s apparatus depend explicitly on
the observed values of S and Q. The state (4) has a nice
interpretation: it is the two-qubit state which gives the
highest violation S of the CHSH inequality for a given
value of the entanglement, measured by the concurrence
C [18].
We now present the proof of the Theorem stated above,
in four steps; see Ref. [17] for more details.
3Proof, Step 1. It is not restrictive to suppose that Eve
sends to Alice and Bob a mixture ρAB =
∑
c pc ρ
c
AB of
two-qubit states, together with a classical ancilla (known
to her) that carries the value c and determines which
measurements Aci and B
c
j are to be used on ρ
c
AB.
The proof of this first statement relies critically on the
simplicity of the CHSH inequality (two binary settings
on each side). We present the argument for Alice, the
same holds for Bob. First, we may assume that the two
measurements A1,2 of Alice are von Neumann measure-
ments, if necessary by including ancillas in the state ρAB
shared by Alice and Bob. Thus A1 and A2 are hermitian
operators on Cd with eigenvalues ±1. It follows from
this that A1A2 is a unitary, hence diagonalizable, oper-
ator. In the basis of Cd formed by the eigenvectors of
A1A2, one can show that A1 and A2 are block-diagonal,
with blocks of size 1 × 1 or 2 × 2 [17, 19]. In other
words, Aj =
∑
c PcAjPc where the Pcs are projectors
of rank 1 or 2. From Alice’s standpoint, the measure-
ment of Ai thus amounts at projecting in one of the (at
most) two-dimensional subspaces defined by the projec-
tors Pc, followed by a measurement of the reduced ob-
servable PcAiPc = ~a
c
i · ~σ. Clearly, it cannot be worse for
Eve to perform the projection herself before sending the
state to Alice and learn the value of c. The same holds
for Bob. We conclude that in each run of the experiment
Alice and Bob receive a two-qubit state. The deviation
from usual proofs lies in the fact that the measurements
to be applied can depend explicitly on the state.
Proof, Step 2. Each state ρcAB can be taken to be a
Bell-diagonal state and the measurements Aci and B
c
j to
be measurements in the (x, z) plane.
To reduce the problem further in this way, we use some
freedom in the labeling together with two applications
of a usual argument. For fixed c (we now omit the in-
dex c), let us first choose the axis of the Bloch sphere
on Alice’s side in such a way that ~a1 and ~a2 define the
(x, z) plane, and similarly on Bob’s side. Eve is a priori
distributing any two-qubit state ρ of which she holds a
purification. Now, recall that we have supposed, without
loss of generality, that all the marginals are uniformly
random. Here comes an argument which is typical of
QKD [5]: knowing that Alice and Bob are going to sym-
metrize their marginals, Eve does not lose anything in
providing them a state with the suitable symmetry. The
reason is as follows. First note that since the (classi-
cal) randomization protocol that ensures 〈ai〉 = 〈bj〉 = 0
is done by Alice and Bob through public communica-
tion, we can as well assume that it is Eve who does it,
i.e., she flips the value of each outcome bit with prob-
ability one half. But because the measurements of Al-
ice and Bob are in the (x, z) plane, we can equivalently,
i.e., without changing Eve’s information, view the clas-
sical flipping of the outcomes as the quantum operation
ρ → ρ˜ = (σy ⊗ σy)ρ(σy ⊗ σy) on the state ρ. We con-
clude that it is not restrictive to assume that Eve is in
fact sending the mixture ρ¯ = 1
2
(ρ+ ρ˜), i.e., that she is
sending a state invariant under σy ⊗ σy. Now, through
an appropriate choice of basis that leaves invariant the
(x, z) plane, and corresponding to the freedom to define
the orientation of yˆ and the direction of xˆ for both Al-
ice and Bob (see [17] for the explicit transformations),
every σy ⊗ σy invariant two-qubit state can be written
in the Bell basis, ordered as {|Φ+〉, |Ψ−〉, |Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉}, in
the canonical form
ρ¯ =


λΦ+ ir1
−ir1 λΨ−
λΦ− ir2
−ir2 λΨ+

 , (5)
with λΦ+ ≥ λΨ− , λΦ+ ≥ λΦ− ≥ λΨ+ and r1, r2 real.
Finally, we repeat an argument similar to the one given
above: since ρ¯ and its conjugate ρ¯ ∗ produce the same
statistics for Alice and Bob’s measurements and provide
Eve with the same information, we can suppose without
loss of generality that Alice and Bob rather receive the
mixture 1
2
(ρ¯+ ρ¯ ∗), which is Bell-diagonal.
Proof, Step 3. For a Bell-diagonal state ρλ with eigen-
values λ ordered as above and for measurements in the
(x, z) plane,
χλ(B1 : E) ≤ F (Sλ) = h
(
1 +
√
(Sλ/2)2 − 1
2
)
, (6)
where Sλ = 2
√
2
√
(λΦ+ − λΨ−)2 + (λΦ− − λΨ+)2 is the
largest violation of the CHSH inequality by the state ρλ.
This step is mainly computational; we sketch it here
and refer to [17] for details. For Bell-diagonal states,
for any choice of B1 = cosϕσz + sinϕσx, one has
S(ρE|b1=0) = S(ρE|b1=1) ≥ h(λΦ+ + λΦ−) with equality
if and only if B1 = σz. It follows that
χλ(B1 : E) ≤ H(λ)− h(λΦ+ + λΦ−) . (7)
The right hand side of this expression is in turn bounded
by the function F (Sλ) appearing in (6). It now suffices to
notice that Sλ = 2
√
2
√
(λΦ+ − λΨ−)2 + (λΦ− − λΨ+)2 is
the maximal violation of the CHSH inequality by the
state ρλ [18, 20]; it is achieved for B1 = σz, B2 = σx,
and A1 and A2 depending explicitly on the λ’s.
Proof, Step 4. To conclude the proof, note that if
Eve sends a mixture of Bell-diagonal states
∑
λ pλ ρλ and
chooses the measurements to be in the (x, z) plane, then
χ(B1 : E) =
∑
λ pλ χλ(B1 : E). Using (6), we then find
χ(B1 : E) ≤
∑
λ pλ F (Sλ) ≤ F (
∑
λ pλ Sλ), where the
last inequality holds because F is concave. But since the
observed violation S of CHSH is necessarily such that
S ≤∑λ pλSλ and since F is a monotonically decreasing
function, we find χ(B1 : E) ≤ F (S).
Key rate. Given the bound (3), the key rate (2) can be
computed for any values of Q and S. As an illustration,
we study correlations satisfying S = 2√2(1 − 2Q), and
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FIG. 1: Extractable secret-key rate against collective attacks
in the usual scenario [χ(B1 : E) given by eq. (8)] and in the
device-independent scenario [χ(B1 : E) given by eq. (3)], for
correlations satisfying S = 2√2(1− 2Q).
which arise from the state |Φ+〉 after going through a de-
polarizing channel, or through a phase-covariant cloner,
or more generally from any Bell-diagonal ρAB such that
λΦ+ ≥ λΨ− and λΦ− = λΨ+ , when doing the measure-
ments A0 = B1 = σz , B2 = σx, A1 = (σz + σx)/
√
2
and A2 = (σz − σx)/
√
2. We consider these correla-
tions because of their experimental significance, but it
is important to stress that Alice and Bob do not need
to assume that they perform the above qubit measure-
ments. The corresponding key rate is plotted in Fig. 1
as a function of Q. For the sake of comparison, we have
also plotted the key rate under the usual assumptions
of QKD for the same set of correlations. In this case,
Alice and Bob have a perfect control of their appara-
tuses, which we have assumed to faithfully perform the
qubit measurements given above. The protocol is then
equivalent to Ekert’s, which in turn is equivalent to the
entanglement-based version of BB84: Eve’s information
on the key is determined by the “phase error” [4], which
can be computed for our protocol using the formalism of
Ref. [5]. One finds ep = 1−Q− S/2
√
2, whence
χ(B1 : E) ≤ h
(
Q+ S/2
√
2
)
. (8)
If ep = Q, i.e., S = 2
√
2(1 − 2Q), this expression yields
the well-known critical QBER of 11% [4], to be com-
pared to 7.1% in the device-independent scenario (Fig. 1).
(Note that the key rate given by eq. (3) is much higher
than the one against a no-signalling eavesdropper ob-
tained by applying the security proof of [14].)
Final remarks. Through its remarkable generality, our
device-independent security proof allows us to ignore the
detailed implementation of the QKD protocol and there-
fore applies in a simple way to situations where the quan-
tum apparatuses are noisy or where uncontrolled side
channels are present. It also applies to the situation
where the apparatuses are entirely untrusted and pro-
vided by the eavesdropper herself. In this latter case,
the proof cannot be applied to any existing device yet,
because of the detection loophole which arises due to inef-
ficient detectors and photon absorption. These processes
imply that sometimes Alice’s and Bob’s detectors will not
fire. A possible strategy to apply our proof to this new
situation is for Alice and Bob to replace the absence of
a click by a chosen outcome, in effect replacing detection
inefficiency by noise. However the amount of detection
inefficiency that can be tolerated in this way is much
lower than the one present in current quantum commu-
nication experiments. In Bell tests, this problem is often
circumvented by invoking additional assumptions such as
the fair sampling hypothesis — a very reasonable one if
the aim is to constrain possible models of Nature, but
hardly justified if the device is provided by an untrusted
Eve. In the light of the present work, the “detection loop-
hole” thus becomes a meaningful issue in applied physics.
In conclusion, we have found the optimal collective at-
tack on a QKD protocol in the device-independent sce-
nario, in which no other assumptions are made than the
validity of quantum physics and the absence of any leak-
age of classical information from Alice’s and Bob’s lab-
oratories. If a suitable de Finetti-like theorem can be
demonstrated in this scenario, the bound that we have
presented here will in fact be the bound against the most
general attacks.
Acknowledgements. We are grateful to C. Branciard,
I. Cirac, A. Ekert, A. Kent, R. Renner and C. Simon
for fruitful discussions. We acknowledge financial sup-
port from the Swiss NCCR “Quantum Photonics”, the
EU Qubit Applications Project (QAP) Contract number
015848, the Spanish projects FIS2004-05639-C02-02 and
Consolider QOIT, the Spanish MEC for a “Juan de la
Cierva” grant, and the IAP project Photonics@be of the
Belgian Science Policy.
[1] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, in Proceedings IEEE Int.
Conf. on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing,
Bangalore, India (IEEE, New York, 1984), pp. 175-179.
[2] A.K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[3] N. Gisin et al, Rev. Mod. Phys 74, 145 (2002); M.
Dusˇek, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, M. Hendrych, in Progress in Op-
tics edited by E. Wolf (Elsevier, New York, 2006), Vol.
49, p. 381.
[4] P. W. Shor, J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000).
[5] B. Kraus, N. Gisin, R. Renner, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95,
080501 (2005); R. Renner, N. Gisin, B. Kraus, Phys. Rev.
A 72, 012332 (2005).
[6] M. Koashi, J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 057902
(2003); D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, J.
Preskill, Quant. Inf. Comput. 5, 325 (2004).
[7] A. Ac´ın, N. Gisin, L. Masanes, Phys. Rev. Lett. 97,
5120405 (2006) ; V. Scarani et al., Phys. Rev. A 74, 042339
(2006).
[8] F. Magniez et al., quant-ph/0512111, Appendix A
[9] A. Ac´ın, S. Massar, S. Pironio, New J. Phys. 8, 126
(2006).
[10] R. Renner, Security of Quantum Key Distribution, PhD
thesis, quant-ph/0512258.
[11] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, N. D. Mermin, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 68, 557 (1992).
[12] D. Mayers, A. Yao, Quant. Inf. Comput 4, 273 (2004).
[13] J. Barrett, L. Hardy, A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95,
010503 (2005).
[14] L. Masanes, A. Winter, quant-ph/0606049
[15] J.F. Clauser, M.A. Horne, A. Shimony, R.A. Holt, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 23, 880 (1969).
[16] I. Devetak, A. Winter, Proc. R. Soc. Lond. A 461, 207
(2005).
[17] A. Ac´ın et al, in preparation.
[18] F. Verstraete, M.M. Wolf, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 170401
(2002).
[19] L. Masanes, Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 050503 (2006).
[20] R. Horodecki, P. Horodecki, M. Horodecki, Phys. Lett. A
200, 340 (1995).
